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INTRODUCTION 
Topic: 
Legality of Western military intervention in Kosovo (1999)  
Hypothesis:  
As a rule, unilateral humanitarian intervention without consent of the state concerned is illegal 
under international law. However, there can be exceptional circumstances where such 
intervention is justified. 
Executive Summary: 
The research focuses on the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions, and I will use the case of 
Kosovo to prove my hypothesis.	  
On the 24th of March 1999, NATO started the air campaign against the former Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The UN Security Council had not authorized this operation, and it was 
the first time when NATO used military forces against a sovereign state that did not pose a 
direct threat to any of the member of the NATO alliance.  
The legal implication of NATO's intervention in Kosovo was the introduction of the UN 
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) framework, which allows for the use of collective armed force 
to stop gross violations of human rights in the case of humanitarian crises.  
This study analyses the legality of NATO's military intervention in Yugoslavia because it set 
forth the first precedent of forced intervention of a group of states without UN authorisation, 
while giving rise to a new legislative practice, namely, the Right to Protect (RtoP).    
The study shows that NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia was unlawful because by that time 
international law had not envisaged any justification of forced intervention by uninvited parties 
to resolve internal conflicts. The military intervention in Kosovo was unauthorized by the UN 
and was by no means caused by any open threat to NATO's member states. The intervention in 
Kosovo resulted in drastic changes in the geographical map of Europe, which were beneficial 
to NATO as it established its first military base in the Balkan region. 
Unilateral humanitarian intervention without consent of the state concerned is still considered 
to be illegal under international law, unless intervention is carried out in line with the principles 
outlined in the UN Right to Protect framework or is authorised by the UN in case there is an 
open threat that the internal conflict may harm any other country. In order to avoid accusations 
in unjustified intervention for pursuing own national goals, a country or a union of countries 
must comply with international laws and seek the UN authorisation. 
Research Goal and Objectives: 
The main goal of the thesis is to examine the criteria for NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 
terms of their compliance with the norms of international humanitarian law. 
In order to achieve the above goal, the following objectives were set: 
- to discuss the goals and methods of preventive diplomacy; 
- to outline norms of international law that relate to use of force by external actors to stop 
mass killing in a conflict area; 
- to provide historical background to Kosovo's war conflict and the legal framework that 
was applied by NATO to justify humanitarian interventions in Yugoslavia; and 
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- to analyze whether NATO's military actions in Kosovo could be considered lawful 
under international law    
Research Question: 
Were NATO's military actions in Kosovo justifiable and legal under international law? 
Research Methods: 
The study was conducted on the basis of analysis of international laws, national legislation of 
Yugoslavia, briefing papers by major international authoritative bodies, including the United 
Nations, as well as books and periodical publications covering the debate of the Western 
military intervention in Kosovo (1999). 
Contents: 
The Bachelor Thesis consists of three chapters. 
The first chapter describes the nature of violent conflicts and dwells upon the concept of 
humanitarian intervention as a military tool of preventive diplomacy.  
The second chapter contains some historical and factual background leading to NATO's 
campaigns in Kosovo as well as provides a legal framework and justification advanced by the 
members of the NATO alliance for the military actions in Yugoslavia.  
The third chapter critically questions whether international law envisages a right for the use of 
force in humanitarian interventions by states that have not been asked for assistance to stop an 
internal conflict and were not authorised for it by the UN Security Council, which will help 
provide an answer to the research question.  
Finally, the conclusion are made based on all the research findings. 
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1. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON DIMPLOMATIC MEDIATION AND 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN CASE OF INTERNAL 
CONFLICTS  
"Each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it judges best.  
Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states because 
there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling  
the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise among  
similar units in a condition of anarchy." 
-- Kenneth Waltz1 
 
Humanitarian intervention is widely considered to be one of the most debated issues in modern 
international law and diplomacy. There is a large body of research and evidence in the 
unacceptability of both inactivity and unreasonable interference in national conflicts that prove 
that each of these approach has its own advantages and drawbacks.  
On the one hand, every sovereign state is guaranteed independence in making decisions 
regarding its policies and interests, without being subject to any pressure from beyond. As 
defined in the West's Encyclopedia of American Law, sovereignty encompasses "the supreme, 
absolute, and uncontrollable power by which an independent state is governed and from which 
all specific political powers are derived; the intentional independence of a state, combined with 
the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign interference"2.   
On the other hand, it is impermissible for the international community to ignore univocal 
violation of human rights in mass murder. As set by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), proclaimed by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on 10 December 
1948, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person." (Article 3); "No one shall 
be held in slavery or servitude." (Article 4); and "No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." (Article 5)3.  
The above human rights tend to be severely violated in internal conflicts, although each 
sovereign state may not only enjoy the privileges of sovereignty but must also bear 
responsibility for the protection of its citizens' rights in compliance with its international 
obligations4. To protect human rights and maintain international order in case of an armed 
conflict, common efforts must be pooled by international organizations (IOs), regional 
organizations (ROs) and non-government organizations (NGOs) to unequivocally condemn 
violence and to methodically resolve the conflict that, for any reason, cannot be stopped by 
inner forces5. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 
p.238. 
2 West's Encyclopedia of American Law (San Francisco: Thomson Gale, 2010), pp.258-259. 
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (10 December 1948), accessed February 12, 2018, 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 
4 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.407. 
5 Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p.7. 
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1.1 Causes of Violent Conflicts  
There is no doubt that, in extremely violent conflicts, humanitarian intervention is necessary to 
avert further escalation of the armed conflict and to prevent its probable spillover across the 
national borders. Yet, care must be taken with identifying the interests of all the parties 
involved in a conflict, including those of the actual powers supporting the conflicting sides.  
Kaufman suggests that the main reason of internal conflicts is rise of nationalism that leads to 
ethnic confrontation whereby local people holding different social beliefs summarized in their 
group's myth-symbol complex begin to oppose other local groups based on language, race and 
religious affiliation6.  
Genocide and mass killing of ethnic and religious minorities take place when the ideology of 
racial superiority that seeks to justify technologies of mass killing, such as gas chambers or 
intercontinental missiles, become fixed in national policies and legislation and supported by the 
majority of the population7. 
Conflicts can also be started by state or non-state actors engaged in national liberation 
movements8. A war of independence (rebellion, revolt, insurgency or revolution) is usually 
fought by the rebelling nationality that often uses guerilla warfare to establish a separate 
sovereign state. 
Rogers also adds terrorism (in the form of state terrorism, sub-state terrorism or terrorism from 
below) as a major cause of human suffering in the world9. Terrorists' victims are threatened 
with violence or killed to gain public attention and to create extreme anxiety and instill fear in 
the targeted community. The long-lasting "Global War on Terror" against the al-Qa'ida sub-
state movement and the like shows how difficult it is to combat terrorist organizations once 
they gain substantial control over a region and manage to spread their destructive ideology 
among population. 
As Acuto indicates, "an international crisis is the abrupt enhancement of disruptive relations as 
a result of a perceived threat to the system or to the lives of those who compose it"10. As the 
above examples of ethnic conflicts, genocide and terrorism show, the threat to the system and 
the subsequent attack against the perceived enemy can arise on various grounds. Buzan 
suggests that violent conflicts arise when any of the following sectors appear to be threatened 
(see Table 1): 
Sector Main concern 
Military The interplay between the armed offensive and defensive capabilities 
of states and states' perceptions of each other's intentions. 
Political The organizational stability of states, systems of government and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Stuart J. Kaufman, "Ethnic Conflict," in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2008), p.200.  
7 Adam Jones, "Genocide and Mass Killing," in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), p.186. 
8 Kenneth Watkin, "21st Century Conflict and International Humanitarian Law: Status Quo or Change?" in 
International Law and Armed Conflict: Exploring the Faultlines, ed.	  Michael N. Schmitt and Jelena Pejic (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), p.268. 
9 Paul Rogers, "Terrorism," in Security Studies: An Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2008), pp.171-174. 
10 Michael Acuto, "Diplomats in crisis," Diplomacy and Statecraft, 22 (2011): p.526.  
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ideologies that ensure their legitimacy. 
Economic Access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain 
acceptable levels of welfare and state power. 
Societal The sustainability and evolution of traditional patterns of language, 
culture as well as religious and national identity and custom. 
Environmental The maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the 
essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. 
Table 1. Causes of conflicts arising from threats to sectors (Buzan, 2016)11 
It is also essential to understand that the nature of violent conflicts is changing. In contrast to 
old wars fought before the end of the twentieth century, contemporary violent conflicts are 
highly decentralized, have civil rather than interstate nature, deploy terror and guerrilla tactics 
instead of fighting on battlefields, use military strategies of population control rather than 
capturing new territory, utilize private armies and criminal gangs instead of professional 
soldiers or conscripts, and are of lower density but with higher magnitude of brutality against 
civilians12. Importantly, conflicts these days most often rely on external rather than internal 
financing. 
Indeed, the growing body of research proves that today's intrastate conflicts often imply foreign 
involvement. Crises have never been homogenous, but modern crises are becoming 
increasingly complex due to globalization. Today's armed conflicts involve more states and a 
wider array of non-state actors, which is why the resolution of internal crises seemingly caused 
by local political tensions often lies in another dimension, namely, that of international 
relations and politics13.  
Of course, a violent ethnic conflict may begin because of clashes between nations populating 
the same territory, as it is happening now between Sunni Muslims, Alawites and Kurds in the 
Syrian civil war. But the examples of the 1947-1989 Cold War between the powers in the 
Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc and of the ongoing confrontation between the US allies and 
Russia's allies prove that interests of opposing groups in states already involved in hot wars are 
often backed up by the actual interests of the two (and now even more) superpowers. 
Therefore, in order to resolve a conflict by diplomatic means, it is necessary to understand not 
only the reasons of a conflict, but also the way in which the structure of the international 
system incites violent conflict outbreaks. 
Political theory distinguishes three structures of international system:  
• unipolar system (with one preponderant power); 
• bipolar system (with two major centers of power dominating politics); and 
• multipolar system (with power distributed among a large number of roughly equal 
countries)14. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era 
(Colchester: ECPR Press, 2016), p.107. 
12 Sinisa Malisevic, "The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objectives of Contemporary Violent 
Conflicts," International Political Sociology 2 (2008): p.98. 
13 Edward Avenell and David Hastings Dunn, "Crisis Diplomacy," in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. 
Costas M. Constantinou et al. (London: SAGE Publications, 2016), p.463. 
14 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (London: 
Pearson, 2007), p.37. 
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Looking at the structure of the international system (and the perceived position of own state in 
it), it is possible to predict the behaviour of states and their propensity to war. In a unipolar 
system, states tend to balance against the hegemon or a rising state that eventually challenges 
the leader. In a multipolar system, wars may occur but they are limited in scope because 
alliances are flexible. Much larger conflicts, even global wars, occur in bipolar systems where 
alliances become more rigid15. The following example illustrates how this principle works in 
practice. 
After World War II and especially during the Cold War, diplomacy became "total in its 
objectives and subject matter."16 Regardless of their stance in the war, international partners 
had to collaborate to effectively deal with industrial, social and technological matters, which 
attained a diplomatic dimension precisely because of their internationalization. And all nations 
mostly cooperated, pursuing the common goal of ensuring international security, which, as 
rightfully remarked by Harold Lasswell in 1936, is "unavoidably political; that is, it plays a 
vital role in deciding who gets what, when, and how in world politics"17. 
The confrontation of the USSR and the USA as two victorious superpowers, however, led to 
the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as an intergovernmental 
military alliance between several North American and European countries in 1949. From the 
beginning, NATO has advocated for stronger trans-Atlantic cooperation between its member 
states to ensure collective defense, peace and security. And, given the military organization’s 
strictly anti-USSR foundation goal, this naturally led to the emergence of a bipolar international 
system. 
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the USA became the hegemon, and the unstoppable 
advancement of US-led NATO further into the Eastern Europe, closer to the borders of Russia, 
in the past quarter of the century aimed to demonstrate the US superpower to the whole world. 
If previously NATO claimed that its advancements to the East served to protect its member 
states primarily from Iran and North Korea, in February 2018 US Secretary of Defence, James 
Mattis, openly declared that now the main US defense policy targets, in line with the new 
National Defence Strategy, are complimented with Russia and China as "revisionist powers" 
seeking "to create a world consistent with their authoritarian models"18. As Mattis stated, "We 
will continue to prosecute the campaign against terrorists that we are engaged in today, but 
great power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of U.S. national security"19.  
Taking into account the numerous ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and 
Eastern Europe and the actual beneficiaries in these conflicts, it can be argued that the 
international tensions fuelled by the "great power competition" will likely escalate into an all-
out war again. The mounting confrontation of the forces in the conflicts in Syria, Iran and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (London: 
Pearson, 2007), p.38. 
16 Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its evolution, theory and administration 
(London: Routledge, 2011), p.185. 
17 Harold Lasswell, cited in Paul D. Williams, "Security Studies: An Introduction," in Security Studies: An 
Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), p.1.  
18 Idrees Ali, U.S. military puts 'great power competition' at heart of strategy: Mattis (19 January 2018), Reuters, 
accessed 5 March 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-china-russia/u-s-military-puts-great-
power-competition-at-heart-of-strategy-mattis-idUSKBN1F81TR. 
19 Idrees Ali, U.S. military puts 'great power competition' at heart of strategy: Mattis (19 January 2018), Reuters, 
accessed 5 March 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-china-russia/u-s-military-puts-great-
power-competition-at-heart-of-strategy-mattis-idUSKBN1F81TR. 
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Yemen, for instance, clearly demonstrates that local and regional conflicts are not run without 
the interference of major superpowers.   
The current preventive diplomacy tools, like economic sanctions or military drills, do not 
appear to bring positive outcomes for re-establishing peace in crisis areas. Nor do the current 
anti-diplomatic practices, including withdrawal of consulates and diplomatic corps, refusal to 
take notice of each other's arguments on important issues in international organisations, and in 
general antagonistic talks between the existing and rising superpowers, which is a sign of a 
deep crisis in international relations20. 
1.2 Goals and Methods of Preventive Diplomacy 
Of all tools that can be applied in international conflict management, diplomacy appears to play 
the most important role since it involves negotiations between the disputing parties with the 
help of competent and knowledgeable intermediaries21. As an effective preventive tool of 
conflict management, diplomatic engagement was institutionalized by the Congress of Vienna 
and later enshrined in the Charter of the UN under Chapter VI on pacific settlement of disputes.  
More specifically, Article 33 of the UN Charter establishes that the parties to any continuing 
dispute that endangers international peace and security shall seek a solution by negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council's role is to 
call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means if necessary22. 
During negotiations, the conflicting parties pursue each other to combine divergent positions 
into a joint decision, which, importantly, has to be a positive-sum outcome23. Meanwhile, 
mediation is different from other forms of diplomatic engagement in that there is a third party 
that steps in to improve communication, include or exclude negotiators, design negotiation 
processes, offer alternatives, formulate workable agreements and seek compromise by means of 
rewards and threats24.    
Non-coercive diplomatic engagement through arbitration, mediation or negotiations may be 
needed when the conflicting parties cannot find common ground altogether, but it is possible 
only when parties agree to resolve the confrontation, abiding by protocols and principles of 
international law, justice and order25.  
Unfortunately, as history shows, mild diplomatic intervention does not always help to stop 
conflicts that got out of control (e.g. genocide against minorities practiced by a major force or 
an oppressive authority in a conflict area). Crisis diplomacy is used to resolve an internal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Corneliu Bjola and Markus Kornprobst, Understanding International Diplomacy: Theory, Practice and Ethics 
(London: Routledge, 2013), p.205. 
21 Karin Aggestam, "Diplomatic Mediation," in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. Costas M. Constantinou et 
al. (London: SAGE Publications, 2016), p.220. 
22 UN Charter (26 June 1945), accessed February 12, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-
full-text/. 
23 William Zartman, "Diplomacy and Negotiation," in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. Costas M. 
Constantinou et al. (London: SAGE Publications, 2016), pp.207. 
24 Karin Aggestam, "Diplomatic Mediation," in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. Costas M. Constantinou et 
al. (London: SAGE Publications, 2016), p.221. 
25 William Zartman, "Diplomacy and Negotiation," in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. Costas M. 
Constantinou et al. (London: SAGE Publications, 2016), pp.207-210. 
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conflict that brings about an abrupt systematic change, reaches a turning point and poses a high 
risk of war26.  
As its name suggests, preventive diplomacy is deployed to prevent disputes between conflicting 
parties to avoid escalation of an ongoing conflict into a full-fledged war. Lund specifies that 
preventive diplomacy is "[a]ction taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use 
of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes 
that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international 
change."27  
According to Lund, preventive diplomacy consists of non-military and military approaches28. 
Since this study analyses whether the NATO's intervention in Kosovo's conflict in 1999 
entailed military rather than merely humanitarian character, it is important to understand which 
tools are usually used for which purposes. Non-military tools of preventive diplomacy, for 
example, may include coercive and non-coercive diplomatic measures, neither of which 
presupposes the use of armed force.  
Coercive diplomatic measures range from diplomatic sanctions (withholding of diplomatic 
relations, recognition as state, or membership in multinational organisations), moral sanctions 
(condemnations of violations of international law), economic sanctions (trade barriers, tariffs, 
restrictions on financial transactions, embargos, etc.) to war crimes trials and tribunals. Non-
coercive diplomatic measures may include international appeals (moral suasion to conflicting 
parties to urge accommodation), fact-finding missions, observation teams, on-site monitoring 
(of instance of violence, human rights abuses), propaganda (directed at violators of 
international principles), third-party mediation and diplomatic consultations, arbitration and 
adjudication, conciliation or concessions (reciprocical gestures by the opposed parties), 
different mechanisms of peaceful settlement of disputes; and other measures that induce parties' 
cooperation. 
Humanitarian intervention belongs to the military approaches of preventive diplomacy, used 
when non-military diplomatic tools have been exhausted. In order to understand whether the 
NATO's intervention in Kosovo's conflict in 1999 abode more with the principles of preventive 
diplomacy or war, it is necessary to know that even military approaches of preventive 
diplomacy do not envisage unrestrained use of armed force. Instead, there may be arms control 
regimes, embargos, non-aggression agreements, pre-emptive peacekeeping forces, 
establishment of demilitarised zones and non-offensive defence force postures. There can also 
be threat of use of force in the form of deterrence policies or security guarantees, applied to 
restore and maintain local or regional balances of power29. 
In Jakobsen's view, coercive diplomacy, whereby diplomatic negotiations are accompanied by 
military threats or limited force, is "as old as the institution of diplomacy"30. Although it is 
widely believed that use of force may be a sign of diplomatic failure, many famous diplomats 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Edward Avenell and David Hastings Dunn, "Crisis Diplomacy," in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. 
Costas M. Constantinou et al. (London: SAGE Publications, 2016), p.463. 
27 Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p.i. 
28 Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p.204 
29 Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p.203. 
30 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Coercive Diplomacy," in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. Costas M. 
Constantinou et al. (London: SAGE Publications, 2016), p.476. 
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have claimed that persuasion must be backed up by "a big stick" (following Theodore 
Roosevelt's policy: "speak softly, and carry a big stick."). Jakobsen cites UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan who once said: "if diplomacy is to succeed, it must be backed both by force and by 
fairness".  
Jakobsen offers the following comparison of diplomacy, non-military and military coercion and 
war (see Table 2): 
 
Dimension 
 
Diplomacy 
Military coercion  
Full-scale war Coercive 
diplomacy 
Compellence / 
Coercive war 
Instruments Persuasion, 
positive 
incentives,  
assurances 
(Military) threats 
and/or symbolic 
use of force, 
assurances 
Military threats 
and use of limited 
force  
Decisive and brute 
force 
Purpose Peaceful 
settlement of 
disputes 
Obtaining 
compliance 
without escalation  
Obtaining 
compliance 
without defeating 
the enemy 
Imposing 
compliance 
through military 
defeat 
Requirements for 
success 
Adversary 
cooperation and 
overlapping 
interests 
Adversary 
cooperation and 
overlapping 
interests 
Adversary 
cooperation and 
overlapping 
interests 
Control: adversary 
cooperation and 
common interests 
are not required 
Table 2. Comparison of diplomacy, coercion and war (Jakobsen, 2016)31 
As Table 2 shows, coercive diplomacy seeks to establish cooperation rather than impose 
controls even if it involves use of limited force. When decisive force is used, like it was used by 
NATO in Kosovo's conflict in 1999, this shall no longer be viewed as diplomacy or military 
coercion; rather, it shall be recognised as a full-scale war, especially taking into consideration 
that the NATO intervention was done without a UN mandate. 
1.3 Legal Implications of Humanitarian Intervention 
Humanitarian intervention is permitted only for the purpose of self-defense in response to an 
armed attack or in case of massive and sustained abuse of human rights32. Chapter VII in the 
Charter of the UN relates to the preventive and enforcement measures against a state that must 
be taken by the international community in case of a conflict that poses threats to peace and can 
be regarded as an act of aggression. 
Under Article 39 of the UN Charter, it is the task of the Security Council to determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and to make 
recommendations on the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security33.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Coercive Diplomacy," in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. Costas M. 
Constantinou et al. (London: SAGE Publications, 2016), p.477. 
32 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.224-227. 
33 UN Charter (26 June 1945), accessed February 12, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-
full-text/. 
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Articles 41 and 42 establish definite measures that can be taken by the international community 
to restore peace in a war conflict. The measures that do not involve the use of armed force may 
include partial or complete interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations (Article 41). If these measures do not lead to a desired result, then more drastic 
measures can be taken to stop the conflict, for example, demonstrations, blockade or the 
deployment of air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations (Article 42)34. 
The UN Charter also protects the right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations (Article 51). Importantly, measures taken 
by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council. And if the Security Council decides undertake additional measures to 
maintain or restore international peace and security as well, this right can be exercised in line 
with the UN Charter35. 
In accordance with Article 46 of the Charter of the UN, decisions on the application of 
collective armed force are made only by the UN Security Council with the assistance of a 
specially formed Military Staff Committee36. This means that humanitarian intervention must 
be authorized by the UN Security Council to be conducted within a legal framework. 
The UN Security Council has to coordinate its actions with the International Criminal Court 
that investigates war crimes and prosecutes war criminals37. Adjudication and arbitration can 
also take place in the International Court of Justice and arbitration panels38. Because the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, namely, France, the Republic of China, 
Russia, the UK and the US, have veto power, the UN can be regarded a limited collective 
security organization if it acts alone39. 
It is necessary to distinguish between the following modes of military intervention to provide 
for legality of a state's interference in another state's affairs: 
• unilateral intervention (carried out by one intervenor without asking for permission); 
• bilateral intervention (based on an agreement between the intervenor and the country in 
which the intervention is made); 
• plurilateral intervention (conducted by an ad hoc group of countries or a security 
alliance); 
• regional intervention (carried out by a regional organization); or 
• multilateral intervention (i.e. UN sanctioned operation by collective international 
forces)40 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 UN Charter (26 June 1945), accessed February 12, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-
full-text/. 
35 UN Charter (26 June 1945), accessed February 12, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-
full-text/. 
36 UN Charter (26 June 1945), accessed February 12, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-
full-text/. 
37 Chris Brown with Kirsten Ainley, Understanding International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), pp.215-217.  
38 Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century (Abingdon: Westview Press, 
2012), p.141. 
39 Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century (Abingdon: Westview Press, 
2012), p.143. 
40 Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum, "Intervening in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: The Role of 
Regional Cooperation," The European Journal of Development Research 17 (2005): p.454. 
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It is usually unilateral and most plurilateral interventions that lack legality in view of the norms 
of international humanitarian law. 
Peacekeeping can serve as an effective coercive diplomatic alternative to secure peace before a 
full-fledged humanitarian war is started. If preventive diplomacy aims to resolve disputes 
before violence breaks out, peacemaking and peacekeeping are resorted to during the conflict 
with the purpose to halt it and to prevent its recurrence in the near future (para.20 of the UN 
Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping)41. 
Peacekeeping is an action that, legally, lies between peaceful settlement of a conflict (Chapter 
VI of the UN Charter) and military enforcement (Chapter VII of the UN Charter)42. The UN 
peacekeeping, for example, involves military personnel without enforcement powers, which is 
responsible for the observation of ceasefires and separation of forces by establishing buffer 
zones after the war. Its main goal is to open and guard food and medical supply lines, create 
safe heavens as well as protect aid workers and refugees.  
Peacekeeping differs from humanitarian war in that it takes place at full consent of all the states 
concerned, implies impartial procedures and uses military force only as a last resort and in self-
defense or in defense of the mandate43. Peacekeeping missions are generally conducted by the 
UN peacekeepers (Blue Berets) or by other military organizations, like NATO or EUFOR 
RCA. 
In summary, the issue of humanitarian intervention has to be approached very accurately as 
there must be a balance between national sovereignty, protection of human rights in violent 
conflicts and maintenance of international order by diplomatic means. The examples of 
intervention in Chapter 1 have shown that unilateral interference in national conflicts without a 
UN mandate can be as dangerous as the international community's inactivity. The international 
law as well as principles of preventive diplomacy covered in this chapter have demonstrated 
that there is a set of accepted procedures and measures, including negotiations, third-party 
arbitration, sanctions and pre-emptive peacekeeping missions that need to be taken first to 
resolve a conflict without the use of international armed force or with the use of limited armed 
force.  
Importantly, the discussion of the application of international law for humanitarian purposes in 
Chapter 1 has suggested that the NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 contained more 
military measures than it would be deemed allowable in accordance with the principles of 
preventive diplomacy. Moreover, given that the NATO's intervention was also unauthorized by 
the UN Security Council, it can be concluded that it was unlawful under international law. The 
following chapter provides a historical background to Kosovo's conflict and points out the 
NATO's actions that exacerbated the conflict by increasing suffering among the civil 
population.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 United Nations (17 June 1992) An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, 
accessed February 26, 2018, http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm. 
42 Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century (Abingdon: Westview Press, 
2012), pp.157-158. 
43 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.266. 
15	  
	  
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF 
NATO'S INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO'S CONFLICT 
2.1 NATO's Interventionist Policy 
"We are coming to realize that foreign operations in today’s world call for  
a total diplomacy. ... American ambassadors can no longer  
be content with wining and dining, reporting,  
analyzing and cautiously predicting." 
-- Chester B. Bowles44 
 
In today's increasingly complex security environment, crisis diplomacy has become a widely 
applied practical strategy. NATO, for instance, views crisis diplomacy as one of its 
fundamental security tasks that can be carried out by means of both military and non-military 
tools to resolve conflicts of political, military or humanitarian nature45.  
NATO reserves the right to use any appropriate measures to intervene in violent conflicts, 
should the organization decide that they "could pose a threat to the security of the Alliance’s 
territory and populations"46. In accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, an 
armed attack against any one of the states in Europe or North America would be considered an 
attack against them all and should be immediately repulsed by collective force47. 
In pursuing its organizational goals, NATO generally complies with UN rules and international 
laws, intervening in international conflicts as a peacekeeping force on the basis of UN 
mandates and often joining the UN peacekeeping forces that are already present in the conflict 
area. UN Resolution 908 (1994), for example, authorized US-led forces to take "all necessary 
measures" to extend close air support in defense of UNPROFOR personnel in Croatia48. 
NATO's mission in Kosovo following the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 
1244 on 10 June 1999 is also regarded to be one of such UN authorized peacekeeping 
operations.   
The 11-week NATO's aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia in the period from 24 March till 10 
June 1999, called Operation Allied Force, nevertheless, was done without a UN mandate. 
NATO justified its military intervention as a humanitarian war that had to be fought "to end the 
ethnic cleansing and repression of human rights perpetrated by the government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia" after diplomatic negotiations failed49. Yet, this case created a 
dangerous precedent of the military organization’s unauthorized forced intervention into a 
country that did not pose any open threat to its member states, and this precedent had taken 
place before the RtoP initiative was proposed.  
The following subchapter discusses Kosovo's case in greater detail.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Chester B. Bowles, cited in Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its evolution, 
theory and administration (London: Routledge, 2011), p.185. 
45 NATO (27 February 2018) Crisis Management, accessed March 2, 2018, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm. 
46 NATO (27 February 2018) Crisis Management, accessed March 2, 2018, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm. 
47 The North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949), accessed February 15, 2018, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm. 
48 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.226. 
49 NATO, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), p.3. 
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2.2 Kosovo's Case (1999) 
"From the start the Kosovo problem has been about how we should react  
when bad things happen in unimportant places." 
-- Thomas Friedman50 
2.2.1 Historical Background of the Conflict 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was one of the states that quickly disintegrated 
after the collapse of the USSR. After the death of Yugoslavia's President Josip Broz Tito in 
1980, the central government lost the ability to mediate multi-ethnic conflicts. The rise of 
nationalism led to the breakup of the country into five states: Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, 
Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina51. 
After Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, ethnic clashes 
took place between Serbs and Croats in Croatia. Ethnic Serbs created their own state Republic 
of Serbian Krajina in Serb-populated regions and resisted the Croatian forces who wanted to 
return the region back under Croatian jurisdiction. 
After Macedonia declared independence in 1991, US forces were deployed under the UN 
mandate to monitor Macedonia's northern borders with the Republic of Serbia. After the 
Yugoslav Army refused to abandon its military base at the Straza Mountain, the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 721 (27 November 1991) to establish peacekeeping operations in 
Yugoslavia. 
The worst ethnic fighting, however, occurred between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia, 
the most heterogeneous region of the former Yugoslavia. Immediately after Bosnia and 
Herzegovina declared independence in spring 1992, Bosnian Serbs declared independent the 
Serbian Republic within Bosnia where Muslims constituted 44%, Serbs 31% and Croats 17% 
of the population.  
While Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence was recognized by the West, Serb-led Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia was expelled from the UN, although it claimed that it should be a sole 
legal successor to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Summer 1992 witnessed the 
first reports of ethnic cleansing whereby Bosnian Muslims were killed or driven away from the 
area of their inhabitancy. In winter 1992-1993, Serb forces were found to block UN 
humanitarian convoys that were directed into the conflict area to help suffering Muslims. In 
spite of their protests, some Bosnian cities were declared by the UN as safe areas for Muslims.  
After Bosnian Serb parliament rejected Vance-Owen Peace Plan that proposed to divide Bosnia 
along ethnic lines, Croatians fighting with Muslims against Serbs began their own ethnic 
cleansing campaign. In autumn 1993, Bosnian army made territorial gains against Croatian 
separatists, and in summer 1994, it captured territory around Bihac. When Serbs recaptured the 
region around Bihac in autumn 1994, NATO bombed runways of Serb-controlled airport in 
Krajina in retaliation. Serbs held more than 300 UN troops hostage. 
On 11 July 1995, the UN safe area Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia was taken by Serbs, as a result 
of which 6000 Muslim men were killed in the worst massacre in Europe since the World War 
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51 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (London: 
Pearson, 2007), pp.158-160. 
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II. In August-September 1995, Croatian forces recaptured Krajina from Serbs and made local 
Serbs flee from massive ethnic cleansing. NATO attacked Bosnian Serbs from air.  
In November 1995, all three parties - Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia - sign the Dayton Peace 
Accord to stop the Bosnian war. NATO's peacekeeping forces were sent to Bosnia. 
According to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, the fact that the Dayton 
negotiations did not include Kosovo as a separate region played a crucial role in future conflict 
escalation. The Dayton Peace Accord formally legitimized Kosovo as part of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, and Germany even repatriated 130,000 Kosovar Albanians. The 
Kosovar Albanians realized that Kosovo was off the current international agenda and that, from 
now on, violent resistance among Kosovars was seen as the only politically realistic path to 
independence52. 
Thus, two years later, in 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was founded in 
1991, made as an insurgency against Belgrade, following the long-lasting nationwide 
restrictions for Kosovar Albanians to have public work, to teach children in their language and 
to read newspapers or watch television in Albanian. The restrictions were clearly 
discriminatory based on ethnicity and language, taking into account the fact that, according to 
1991 census conducted in the Federal Republic Yugoslavia, 82% of Kosovo population were 
Albanians and 10% Serbs53.   
The escalating conflict was observed and reported upon by many NGOs, including Human 
Rights Watch, Mercy Corps, Amnesty International, human rights groups in Kosovo and in 
Belgrade such as the Humanitarian Law Foundation and the Yugoslav Red Cross. Some NGOs 
called for a UN protectorate, for example, the UN Peoples Organization, the Transnational 
Foundation in Sweden, the Helsinki Citizens Assembly and the Minnesota Advocates for 
Human Rights. The involvement of some other NGOs was more profound: for instance, the 
Communita di Sant'Egidio negotiated the education agreement in 1996, whereas the Open 
Society Foundation of Belgrade (OSF) supported a parallel education system to foster dialogue 
among Albanians and Serbs54. 
Yet, in 1998, the President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic sent troops to Kosovo and rejected 
international involvement to resolve the conflict. The reports on the internal armed conflict in 
the period from February 1998 till March 1999 in Kosovo abounded in details of crimes 
committed by both parties of the conflict. The Serb forces and authorities were found to have 
killed civilians, including dozens of women and children, attacked the fleeing civilians, 
attacked and restricted humanitarian workers, made arbitrary arrests and detentions, restricted 
the media, and initiated forced disappearances. Reported KLA abuses focused predominantly 
on abductions of Serbs, Roma and collaborating Albanians, excessive use of force, arbitrary 
detentions, disappearances and extra-judicial executions55. 
The escalation of the internal armed conflict had significant consequences. Before the 
Drenice/Drenica violence and the Yugoslav police brutality against the peaceful student 
protests in Prishtina/Pristina, support of the KLA was minimal. The KLA had no political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), p.59. 
53 Adam Roberts, "NATO's Humanitarian War over Kosovo," Survival 41 (1999): p.120. 
54 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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programme, official representation or international recognition; it had no control over military 
forces of any significance either. But the reports of massacres in Drenice/Drenica and 
Prishtina/Pristina suddenly made the KLA the main driving force of national liberation in the 
eyes of the majority of Kosovar Albanians. As soon as the KLA claimed growing political 
power, support for the LDK party's non-violent parallel state strategy diminished56. 
After Yugoslav authorities rejected an external peacekeeping force in line with the Rambouillet 
Accords on 23 March in Paris, NATO began airstrikes throughout Yugoslavia. The phased air 
operation, called Operation Allied Force, was initiated by NATO's Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR) Gen. Wesley Clark57. NATO had been present in the region as 
a peacekeeping force already since January 1999 to ensure ceasefire between the parties of the 
conflict. It is important to note here that at that moment NATO installed the peacekeepers by 
force without obtaining the UN authorization. 
The NATO's unauthorized military intervention in the period from 24 March till 10 June 1999 
was accompanied by many aggravating crimes as well. Apart from the fact that the intervention 
itself was unlawful under international law since there was no UN mandate for it, there were 
cases of crime against civilians committed by NATO forces. In the beginning, the primary 
goals of the air forces from thirteen NATO Member States that participated in the operation 
(Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States) were airfields, command and 
control sites, barracks and headquarters of the special police to neutralize the Yugoslav air 
defense system. However, later NATO launched strategic attacks to cut the Yugoslav army and 
MUP (Ministry of Interior) forces off their military-industrial infrastructure, supply routes and 
resources, including news media, which could not but hurt civilians58.  
Throughout the operation, the air attacks by NATO significantly increased not only in terms of 
goals but also in terms of intensity. The rate at which targets were hit increased from initial 
eight hours per day to twenty-four hours per day. By the end of the conflict, NATO had 
attacked over 900 targets, flying a total of 37,465 sorties. Although NATO claimed that all 
precautionary measures had been taken to minimize civilian casualties, Human Rights Watch 
reported that 489-528 Yugoslav civilians were killed in the ninety separate incidents in 
Operation Allied Force59. The deaths resulted from attacks on a range of targets, under 
different circumstances and from a variety of munitions. The people were killed in Serbia, 
Montenegro and Kosovo, with up to 60 percent of the total number of deaths being in Kosovo. 
A third of the incidents were a result of attacks on targets in densely populated urban areas.  
The Kumanovo Treaty signed on 9 June 1999 in Kumanovo, Macedonia, concluded the 
Kosovo war as the Yugoslav forces agreed to withdraw from Kosovo. In accordance with this 
treaty, Kosovo was placed under UN-mandated administration and under the military 
protection of a NATO-led international peacekeeping force Kosovo Force (KFOR).   
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In 2001, the UN Supreme Court based in Kosovo maintained that during the Kosovo conflict 
more than 13 thousand people were killed or went missing, with over 1.2 million Kosovo 
Albanians being displaced and over 200 thousand non-Albanians fleeing the region.  
In May 1999, the UN war crimes tribunal indicted Slobodan Milosevic as war criminal, but his 
trial in the Hague would take place only in 2002.  
In 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was officially renamed Serbia and Montenegro. In 
2006, however, Montenegro became an independent nation, and Serbia became the legal 
successor of Serbia and Montenegro.  
The Republic of Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, gaining recognition from 
more than a hundred states worldwide. Kosovo remains a disputed territory till present, as 
Serbia has not recognized it as an independent state. Serbia has recognized the administration 
of Kosovo's elected government but it continues to claim the territory as its own Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo and Metohija. 
2.2.2 Legal Framework Underlying Military Intervention in Kosovo (1999) 
According to NATO, the 1999 military intervention in Kosovo was determined by the 
escalation of conflict between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovar Albanian forces 
during 199860. The clashes between the conflicting parties that year resulted in the deaths of 
over 1 500 Kosovar Albanians and forced 400 000 people from their homes. 
On 28 May 1998, NATO set out two major objectives to resolve the crisis in Kosovo: 
• to help to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis by contributing to the response of 
the international community; and 
• to promote stability and security in neighboring countries, especially Albania and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia61. 
UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998 condemned "the recent 
intense fighting in Kosovo and in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by 
Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous civilian 
casualties"62. The resolution indicated that the conflict had already led to the displacement of 
over 230,000 persons from their homes, many of whom fled to Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and other European countries as a result of the use of force in Kosovo. Up to 
50,000 of refugees were estimated to have no shelter and other basic necessities.  
Therefore, Resolution 1199 (1998) required that all parties, groups and individuals should 
immediately cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and that there should be established meaningful dialogue between the authorities 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership. Both parties of the 
conflict were required to take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to 
reduce the risks of the impending humanitarian catastrophe. The dialogue between the parties 
was to be entered immediately, without preconditions and with international involvement"63.  
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Resolution 1199 (1998) recalled Resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, which condemned 
"the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful 
demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any 
other group or individual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo" and called for 
a meaningful dialogue on political status issues between the authorities in Belgrade and the 
leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community64. Besides the dialogue, the resolution required 
withdrawal of the special police units and cessation of action by the security forces affecting 
the civilian population, access to Kosovo for humanitarian organizations and representatives of 
Contact Group and other embassies, return of OSCE long-term missions as well as organisation 
of a mission to Kosovo by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights65. 
Since the above requirements set forth in Resolution 1160 (1998) had not been met, Resolution 
1199 (1998) repeatedly required the cessation of action by the security forces affecting the 
civilian population and withdrawal of the special police units, continuous international 
monitoring in Kosovo by the European Community Monitoring Mission and diplomatic 
missions accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as facilitation of the safe 
return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, in agreement with the UN Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)66. 
After a further deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, despite the above US Security Council 
resolutions, the NATO Council authorized Activation Orders for air strikes on 13 October 
1998. The orders were meant to support diplomatic measures undertaken to make the Milosevic 
regime withdraw forces from Kosovo, to end the violence and facilitate the return of refugees 
to their homes. After President Milosevic agreed to comply, the air strikes were called off67. 
On 24 October 1998, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1203 (1998), which 
condemned "all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals 
by any group or individual, and all external support for such activities in Kosovo, including the 
supply of arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo", being "deeply alarmed and 
concerned at the continuing grave humanitarian situation throughout Kosovo and the 
impending humanitarian catastrophe"68. While calling for a dialogue between the conflicting 
parties, the resolution also asked Member States and international organizations to make 
available personnel to the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo and provide adequate 
resources for humanitarian assistance in the region in line with the United Nations 
Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the Kosovo crisis.  
In accordance with Resolution 1203, the OSCE established a Kosovo Verification Mission 
(KVM) to observe compliance on the ground, while NATO established an aerial surveillance 
mission and a special military task force to assist the OSCE deployed in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. These steps did not help resolve the conflict, and on 30 January 1999 
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NATO's Contact Group principally agreed to use air strikes if required, issuing a warning to 
both sides in the conflict69. 
During negotiations in Rambouillet near Paris from 6 February to 18 March 1999, the Kosovar 
Albanian delegation signed the proposed peace agreement, but the Serbian delegation did not. 
Immediately afterwards, Serbian military and police forces intensified operations against the 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, moving extra troops and tanks into the region, and on 20 March, 
the OSCE KVM was withdrawn from the region, facing insurmountable obstruction from 
Serbian forces. After President Milosevic refused to stop attacks on the Kosovar Albanians 
under the threat of imminent NATO air strikes, on 23 March the order to carry out air strikes 
was given70. 
Although there was a public debate on the legality of NATO's actions, there was no 
denouncement of them on the part of the UN Security Council. The only resolution on 
Kosovo's conflict that was adopted by the UN Security Council during the intervention was 
Resolution 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999. The resolution expressed grave concern at the 
humanitarian catastrophe in and around Kosovo and reminded that all Member States urgently 
needed provide humanitarian assistance in accordance with:  
- the Charter of the United Nations;  
- the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;  
- the international covenants and conventions on human rights;  
- the Conventions and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees;  
- the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977; and 
- other instruments of international humanitarian law71. 
The above pieces of international law, together with the mentioned UN resolutions, formed the 
main legal framework underlying the international community's intervention in Kosovo's 
conflict. 
On legal grounds, NATO-led international peacekeeping force, the KFOR, entered Kosovo on 
11 June 1999, two days after the signing of the Kumanovo Treaty on 9 June 1999 in 
Kumanovo, Macedonia, and one day after the adoption of Resolution 1244 (1999) by the UN 
Security Council. The resolution was adopted on 10 June 1999 by 14 members, with China 
abstaining from, but not vetoing, the resolution. 
With the adoption of Resolution 1244 (1999), the UN Security Council recalled its resolutions 
1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 
1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999, admitting that "there has not been full compliance with 
the requirements of these resolutions"72. 
Resolution 1244 (1999) primarily aimed to "to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in 
Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all 
refugees and displaced persons to their homes."   
To ensure peace in the war-torn region and the safety and security of international personnel to 
be deployed there under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, Resolution 1244 (1999) called 
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for an immediate end to violence and repression in Kosovo and for a phased withdrawal from 
Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary Yugoslav forces. The resolution permitted a 
return to Kosovo of an agreed number of withdrawn Yugoslav and Serb military and police 
personnel, decided on the deployment of international civil and security presences in Kosovo, 
under United Nations auspices and, notably, authorized UN Member States and relevant 
international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo73. 
In accordance with Resolution 1244 (1999), the responsibilities of the international security 
presence deployed in Kosovo included deterrence of renewed hostilities, demilitarisation of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups, establishment of a 
secure environment for refugees and displaced persons, ensuring public safety and order until 
the arrival of the international civil forces, monitoring borders as well as protection of the 
freedom of movement74. 
Meanwhile, the responsibilities of the international civil presence in line with Resolution 1244 
(1999) included promotion of the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government 
in Kosovo, support of the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions, facilitation 
of a political process of determining Kosovo's future status in line with the Rambouillet accords 
(S/1999/648) and the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions 
established under a political settlement, thereby legitimising Kosovo's right to autonomy. 
International civil forces also provided humanitarian and disaster relief aid, helped with 
reconstruction of key infrastructure, protected human rights by assuring the safe and 
unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo as well as 
helped maintain civil law and order, including the establishment of local police forces75. 
Thus, NATO's presence in Kosovo after the adoption of Resolution 1244 was lawful as it was 
authorized by the UN Security Council and was carried out in full compliance with the 
provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN. 
In summary, Kosovo's long-lasting conflict was mainly caused by ethnic intolerance and 
confrontation between the Yugoslav government and local Kosovar Albanian forces that strove 
for independence. The conflict could be stopped neither by internal forces nor by the 
international community, which did not recognize the strength of the KLA and overestimated 
the official Yugoslav elite's ability to restrain the conflict without excessive use of force that 
led to one of the greatest humanitarian catastrophes in Europe after World War II.  
NATO's unilateral decision to military intervene in Kosovo in 1999 should be regarded 
unlawful by international law because it was unauthorized by the UN and because it led to a big 
number of deaths among civilians. The example of NATO's intervention, covered at length in 
Chapter 2, demonstrates that both international law and the rule of law set by the strongest 
military power may have flaws that prevent the international community's timely intervention 
in war conflicts and exacerbate human suffering in war-torn regions. The following chapter 
analyses the NATO's interventionist policy against the norms of international law and describes 
the consequences of Kosovo's conflict resolution for international and humanitarian law.   
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3. ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE CRITERIA FOR 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO 
3.1 Adherence of the USA to the Rule of Law in International Affairs  
"We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment... Today that new world  
is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known.  
A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world  
in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom  
and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of  
the weak... America and the world must support  
the rule of law -- and we will." 
-- George Bush76 
 
Yoram Dinstein is one of the most prominent scholars studying international law applicable to 
war conflicts. His areas of interest include the jus ad bellum (the law of resort to the use of 
armed force); the jus in bello (the law of armed conflict that regulates the deployment of armed 
force); and international human rights77. Referring to Dinstein's works, Murphy argues that it is 
in these three areas that the USA has repeatedly demonstrated inability (or reluctance) to adhere 
to the rule of law in international affairs78. 
The United States has often proclaimed its support for the rule of law in international affairs. 
George Bush's quotation in the beginning of the chapter is one of US presidents' declarations on 
the USA's responsibility for global peace and justice and support of the rule of law in 
international affairs. Perhaps, the reason why some countries' actions in war conflicts are often 
debatable is the problem of terminology (here, "the rule of law") and interpretation of existing 
legislation, which sometimes has self-contradictory provisions.  
So far, the rule of law principles have been explicitly laid down by Richard H. Fallon. The rule 
of law is claimed to serve three main purposes: 
1) protect against anarchy and the Hobbesian war of all against all; 
2) ensure that people know in advance the legal consequences of various actions and plan 
their steps accordingly; and 
3) guarantee against official arbitrariness79. 
Taking into account the above purposes of the rule of law, Fallon has worked out five elements 
that constitute the rule of law: 
a) capacity of legal rules and standards to guide people in the conduct of their affairs (to 
comply with law, people must understand it); 
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b) efficacy (people must obey, and be guided by, law); 
c) stability (to plan and coordinate actions over time, people must be guided by 
reasonably stable law); 
d) supremacy of legal authority (everyone should be equal before law: the law should rule 
officials and ordinary citizens); and 
e) impartial justice (courts should follow fair procedures in law enforcement)80. 
Perfectly realised, the rule of law would then have the following characteristics: 
• guiding people in the manner consistent with the originally intended and understood 
meaning of the directives devised by legitimate, democratically-accountable 
lawmaking authorities;  
• comprising intelligible rules that bind citizens, governmental officials and judges 
alike;  
• interpreted in line with publicly accessible norms and commonly accepted reason-
giving; and  
• conforming to legitimate public purposes and shared principles of political morality81. 
When any of the above elements of the law is not satisfied, the rule of law cannot be 
completely realized, but it still could be approximated rather than abandoned altogether to 
preserve justice and order. 
As pointed out by Tamanaha, most laws are followed most of the time, but the most powerful 
states may disregard international law, for example, by leaving international organizations if it 
is believed to be in their national interest at any given time (including the preservation of the 
regime in power). "Realpolitik remains a predictable mainstay of international law," argues 
Tamanaha82. And while certain subjects, especially relating to commerce, have recently been 
treated remarkably more compliant with transnational laws, other subjects, like human rights, 
are perceived to have a more symbolic meaning and are often respected less.  
As Waldron succinctly remarks, the rule of law is often cited by media and exploited by 
political opposition as a matter of reproach to the regime, as a benchmark of political 
legitimacy83. The ideal of the rule of law is allegedly deployed to protect democracy, human 
rights and free market economy, but one may only guess what real goals are pursued by those 
who claim that a society may be in a crisis of the rule of law because claims about the breach of 
the rule of law are varying from case to case, often being, again, self-contradictory in form. 
As history shows, the principle of the rule of law is not always applied fairly by lawmakers or 
interpreted correctly by parties, especially in war conflicts. Since the 1990s, the Western 
coalition headed by the USA and its NATO allies has significantly altered the interpretation of 
the normative framework that regulates global affairs84. Being the dominant global military, 
political and economic force, the USA, under the disguise of collective NATO forces, has 
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intervened in domestic affairs all over the world by using unlimited force contrary to the norms 
set out in the UN Charter that regulate actions in humanitarian crises.  
The very existence of the United States as the superpower immediately after the World War II 
secured its strong support of the rule of law concept in international relations. As the 
predominant authority in world affairs, the USA had a so-called "automatic majority" in the UN 
and exerted overriding influence in major international institutions, using an opportunity to 
participate in the development of law compatible with its national interests85. With the passage 
of time, however, the USA gradually began to lose the control over the international legal 
process as other superpowers were rising and together with the third world states became a 
majority in the UN. It has led to a situation today where the UN Security Council, for example, 
is often unable to maintain international peace because there would not be unanimity of view 
among its permanent members86. 
In many cases since the 1990s, the USA has acted unilaterally, which increases a chance of 
arbitrary, or even unlawful, decisions. Allott explains the US role of the "world's policeman" as 
a result of its ruling elite's desire to spread democracy and capitalism in most countries, which, 
they believe, will produce an orderly world, capable of self-ordering and self-improvement87. 
All the USA has achieved by this policy is bigger alienation from the countries in many parts of 
the world that have directly experienced the "policeman's" unrelenting pressure:  
On issue after issue, the United States has found itself increasingly alone, with one or a few 
partners, opposing most of the world’s states and peoples. These issues include UN dues; 
sanctions against Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and Libya; the land mines treaty; global warming; an 
international war crimes tribunal; the Middle East; the use of force against Iraq and Yugoslavia; 
and the targeting of 35 countries with new economic sanctions between 1993 and 199688. 
Notably, the USA interferes in domestic affairs of regions that are strategically important, 
which means that geo-politics and geo-economics play a more important role in the US 
interventionist policy than alleged extreme human rights violations. The US tactical approach 
to the oil-rich Middle East has severely destabilised the region and increased resentment 
towards the superpower. During his presidency, George Bush himself openly stressed the 
importance of diversifying US oil supplies and securing oil resources89. The US invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 was allegedly done in the name of fighting a global war against terror and stopping 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, but many academics disapprove of the intervention 
and point to its drastic consequences, namely, the collapse of the Iraqi state, a violent civil war, 
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and tens of thousands of deaths90. The war on terror challenged many accepted legal norms, 
including the prohibition on torture91. 
Kosovo also has a significant strategic location in the Balkans, serving as a link between central 
and southern Europe and having access to the Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea. After the Kosovo 
war, NATO established its headquarters for KFOR's Multinational Battle Group East (MNBG-
E) in camp Bondsteel near Ferizaj in the eastern part of Kosovo. With the facilities for up to 
7,000 soldiers, camp Bondsteel is now the largest US base in the Balkans92.  
The USA's frivolous interpretation of the rule of law in international affairs shall not be 
ignored. As highlighted by Harel and Sharon, the violation of moral rules in extreme cases is 
not so atrocious as their principled or rule-governed violation93. There must be a clear 
distinction between acts performed under the direction of principles or rules and unprincipled, 
context-generated acts. When the USA or the NATO's alliance claim that they have the right to 
break the international law under whatever circumstances, the very fact of such a claim shall 
sound alarming for the international community.  
According to Tamanaha, this discrepancy with interpreting and abiding by international law 
can be explained by conflicting views on traditional and modern understandings of law94. The 
traditional view maintains that law is limited by principles of reasoning and is designed on the 
basis of community norms clearly stipulating the good and right. Meanwhile, the instrumental 
view entails only means-ends reasoning: once an end has been decided upon, law can be used 
in any way possible to advance the designated end, without limit. Instrumentalists suppose that 
as long as the formal or procedural requirements of law are met, there can be no legal 
objections against using law for morally terrible purposes (e.g. justifying torture to combat 
terrorism, which would be unacceptable in accordance with a principled law).  
Both the US President George Bush (on 11 September 2001)  and the UK Prime Minister Tony 
Blair (in July of 2005) proclaimed that the rule of law was optional for liberal democratic 
societies and was in general a dispensable luxury that could be discarded in times of 
emergency95. These examples prove that international law can be a means to an end if a 
powerful interventionist insists on it. 
As one can see, in many interventions, the US decisive, albeit unlawful, actions were not 
denounced by the international community; in some cases, like in the Libyan conflict, they 
even led to new regulations justifying the invader's use of force. For instance, the dispute over 
the legality of the no-fly zones (NFZ) in Iraq, proclaimed by the USA, UK and France after the 
Gulf War of 1991, provided the legal contours of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention that 
was adopted afterwards96. Importantly, the unilateral interpretation of UN Security Council's 
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resolutions and the use of force by these countries took place by bypassing the UN Security 
Council altogether. These practices continued in the 1998 bombing of Afghanistan and Sudan 
within the Operation Infinite Reach. NATO's aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia from 24 
March till 10 June 1999 within the Operation Allied Force was also done without a UN 
mandate, but was eventually approved by UN Security Council's Resolution 1244, which 
redesigned Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN by giving a mandate to the international 
civilian administration and NATO-led military force from June 1999. 
Given the USA's leading role in international affairs, there must be a fine balance in the 
country's foreign policy strategy, especially when it concerns compliance with norms of 
international law. Adherence to the rules of law by all actors is undoubtedly the only 
prerequisite of order and security on international arena.   
3.2 Compliance of NATO's Justifications for Intervention in Kosovo with 
Rule of Law Principle and Norms of International Law  
According to Roberts, NATO's military intervention in Kosovo was unique from several 
perspectives. Firstly, the intervention was the first sustained use of armed force by the NATO 
alliance in its 50-year existence. Secondly, it was the first time when destructive armed force 
by a major player was used without UN Security Council's authorisation, albeit in line with its 
resolutions. Thirdly, it was the first major bombing campaign to stop crimes against humanity 
within the borders of a state. Finally, it was the first bombing campaign that, without land 
operations, resulted in a change of policy by the target government97. 
Although in its account of procedures and laws followed prior to the 1999 Kosovo intervention 
NATO mentions various UN Security Council resolutions98, none of these resolutions, except 
Resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, authorised use of force by a military organisation.  
As explained in Chapter 2.2.2, UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 
1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 
14 May 1999 on Kosovo's conflict raised the questions of the necessity to stop violence by 
internal forces (the Serbian military and police forces and Kosovar Albanian forces) and called 
for assistance from Member States and international organizations, like the Red Cross or 
OSCE, in monitoring and the provision of humanitarian aid.  
From the above perspective, the NATO military intervention in Kosovo from 24 March till 10 
June 1999, called Operation Allied Force, was unlawful under international law as it was done 
without a UN mandate. This coincides with the traditional view on the rule of law, which, as 
described in Chapter 3.1, is limited by principles of reasoning and is designed on the basis of 
community norms clearly stipulating the good and right. In line with this traditional view, 
whatever provisions the UN Charter sets out, they must be obeyed without questioning. 
NATO claims that its military intervention in Kosovo pursued the important goal of ending the 
ethnic cleansing and repression of human rights perpetrated by the government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia99. NATO calls its actions in the former Yugoslavia as extension of "the 
culture of dialogue and cooperation on security issues": 
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Increasingly, through the work of the NATO-led forces supporting the peace process in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, this culture is influencing the process of reconciliation between 
communities and is helping to lay the groundwork for future cooperation in the much troubled 
Balkan region.100 
Ending the humanitarian crisis in the Balkan region was one of NATO's priorities in the 1990s. 
However, according to Aust, humanitarian intervention is permitted only for the purpose of 
self-defense in response to an armed attack or in case of massive and sustained abuse of human 
rights101. Moreover, humanitarian intervention must be:  
- necessary (with no viable alternative);  
- limited to the immediate purpose (without any reprisals, retribution or exemplary or 
punitive attacks); and 
- reasonable and proportionate to the threat or the force used against it102. 
One of counterarguments for NATO's aerial bombing of Kosovo is that it was not done for the 
purpose of self-defense in response to an armed attack against one of its member states (which 
is one of the premises of collective security at NATO). But NATO argues that it intervened in 
Kosovo's conflict to stop massive and sustained abuse of human rights (ethnic cleansing)103. If 
one analyses the characteristics of the aerial bombing as a means to stop the abuse of human 
rights, then it can be argued whether the bombing saved lives or increased human suffering 
even further (i.e. whether it was reasonable and proportionate to the threat), which is likely to 
be the latter. There is also a doubt that the military operation was limited to the immediate 
purpose as it lasted for eleven weeks. 
With regard to the necessity in NATO's measures, it can be stated that other viable alternatives 
of non-coercive diplomatic measures, suggested by Lund, had been used indeed but 
unfortunately without success. There were international appeals,  fact-finding missions and 
observation teams, third-party mediation, arbitration, adjudication, commissions of inquiry, 
mechanisms of peaceful settlement of disputes and political incentives to induce parties' 
cooperation104.   
The most serious objection against NATO's intervention in Kosovo, however, is the number of 
deaths among civilians caused by its aerial bombing. If initial air attacks were justified by 
NATO as a means to destroy the Yugoslav air defence system, then further strategic attacks on 
wider Yugoslav military-industrial infrastructure, supply routes and resources, including news 
media, do raise a question of proportionality of intensified intervention to the actual threat. 
Without doubt, it was obvious for NATO that intensification of air strikes on a larger territory 
would eventually lead to a bigger number of civilian deaths. 
According to Massa, both the high number of casualties and the circumstances in which they 
occurred (people were attacked during daylight in public places) gave rise to the question 
whether the NATO forces had committed war crimes and should be held criminally responsible 
for their actions before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
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(ICTY)105. As mentioned in Chapter 2.2.2, NATO's aerial bombing campaign led to the deaths 
of 489-528 Yugoslav civilians who were killed in the ninety separate incidents during the 
Operation Allied Force. 
However, on 2 June 2000, the Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla del Ponte concluded "that there 
[was] no basis for opening an investigation into any of the allegations or into other incidents 
related to the NATO air campaign"106. While acknowledging that some mistakes were made by 
NATO, the Prosecutor nevertheless announced that "there was no deliberate targeting of 
civilians or unlawful military targets by NATO during the campaign." The decision by the 
Prosecutor of the Tribunal not to investigate NATO's war crimes has generated strong criticism 
among the majority of scholars who argue that the Prosecutor's decision was based on political 
rather than legal considerations. 
Despite the above arguments, it may also be argued that UN Security Council's procrastination 
in taking decisive measures against the conflicting parties in Kosovo might have been to blame 
as much as NATO's UN unauthorized aerial bombing. It must be remembered that Resolution 
1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 was adopted by 14 members out of 15, which means that the 
international community overwhelmingly agreed that common effort had to be pooled to end 
violence in the region by any forces if the internal forces were unable to do it for such a long 
period of time (the 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo was the second serious escalation of the 
ethnic conflict in the region in the decade). A question remains why four preceding 
unsuccessful resolutions had not been enough for the UN Security Council to intervene into the 
conflict more substantially already in March 1999.   
Moreover, taking into account the eventual redesign of Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN to 
enable the international military forces' intervention for humanitarian purposes, it may be 
argued that the international law at the moment of the NATO's unauthorized intervention had 
certain flaws. If one analyses the flaws in line with Fallon's elements of the rule of law, it turns 
out that Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN in March 1999 lacked efficacy (for the 
community to obey it, it must provide effective guidance).  
Obviously, a certain cut-off period shall be set in the UN Charter for the subjects of the UN 
Security Council resolutions to implement what is ordered. If they do not comply with the 
orders and violence proceeds, more drastic measures, including military force, must be taken by 
the international community to stop it. Then all other elements of the rule of law, especially 
capacity of legal rules and standards to guide people in the conduct of their affairs and 
supremacy of legal authority, are likely to be respected by all countries as well. 
3.3 Introduction of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) Norm in International 
Law after Kosovo's Case 
In 2005, World Summit introduced the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP or R2P) principle to be 
kept to by all governments "to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
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and crimes against humanity"107. The RtoP norm was initiated after the failure of the 
international community to stop the atrocities committed in the Balkans and Rwanda in the 
1990s108.  
In particular, para.138 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Resolution stresses that: 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning 
capability109. 
Again, the 2005 World Summit Outcome Resolution underlines that collective action in line 
with the RtoP policy can be taken only through (i.e. authorized by) the UN Security Council. 
As put forward in para.139 of the resolution: 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to 
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means 
be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity110. 
Use of force, nonetheless, remains one of the most controversial topics in international law. 
Use of force is lawful within a state to restore peace and security when deployed consistently 
with international human rights obligations and the law of armed conflict, and when a state 
sends forces to another state at its request to restore order111.  
Despite managing to mitigate tensions in war regions, use of force in humanitarian intervention 
is harshly criticized as invoking RtoP infringes sovereignty and territorial integrity112. 
According to A Dictionary of Diplomacy, humanitarian intervention is "inconsistent with the 
norm of state sovereignty" altogether because it implies external actors' interference in 
domestic affairs and calls into question the legitimacy of using some instruments during the 
intervention, such as propaganda, embargo, bombing and the use of ground forces113.     
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The above argument, however, can be refuted by the actual failure of the state to perform its 
primary function when mass killing unfolds, that of protection of its citizens' rights. As clearly 
outlined in the RtoP core principles by the Independent International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS): 
A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the 
protection of its people lies with the state itself. 
B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, 
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or 
avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to 
protect114. 
In order to avoid accusations of unlawful and unjust intervention, humanitarian forces must 
ensure that RtoP efforts are taken only to prevent an internal conflict, to react to large scale loss 
of life or ethnic cleansing with appropriate coercive measures and to rebuild the community 
after the intervention115.  
The following principles of RtoP that justify humanitarian intervention in case of extreme 
crises have been modified from the just war doctrine:  
1. The primary intention for intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering. 
2. Intervention can only be justified when every non-military option has been explored. 
3. The scale, duration and intensity of the military intervention must be kept to a 
minimum. 
4. In halting or averting human suffering, consequences of interveners' action should not 
be worse than the consequences of their inaction116. 
3.4 A Need for Balance in Strategies of Armed Conflict Resolution  
One of the key points in international conflict management is the understanding of strategies 
applied by states to achieve their foreign policy goals. There are two schools of thought in 
relation to the meaning of crisis diplomacy. The first school regards crisis diplomacy as a 
strategy to peacefully resolve a confrontation to avoid full-fledged war, whereas the second one 
views preventive diplomatic measures as exercises in winning, as a means to make the enemy 
capitulate and to further one's own ambitions117.  
Manufacturing crises through "revolutions" is one of the most widely practiced tactics to pursue 
the second strategy. As it could be seen in the Libyan conflict and can now be witnessed in the 
Syrian conflict, revolutions are manufactured by the real beneficiary's gaining advantage from 
some political tensions in the region118. Mahatma Gandhi and Ho Chi Ming can be mentioned 
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as other examples of crisis makers seeking radical change through the manufacturing of 
international crisis. 
Perhaps, the second strategy should be considered one of the worst diplomatic measures as it 
does not seek to reduce the tension between the conflicting parties. On the contrary, the 
opposing party, often consisting of armed militants, is supported by all possible means to 
overthrow the legitimate power, which is always in the interests of the actual superpower 
standing behind the protesters.  
As the result of the Libya's Arab spring shows, a superpower's assistance in a group's 
revolutionary attempts to manufacture a crisis to challenge legitimacy or the status quo seldom 
leads to peace in the region. After the replacement of the Gaddafi government with the National 
Transitional Council (NTC), some militias refused to disarm and cooperate with the NTC, 
which led to a second civil war in Libya119. 
Sometimes, crisis manufacturing in one particular region creates an even more dangerous 
violent force that is able to bring terror to the wider international community. The roots of the 
terrorist organization ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria), for example, are in the Sunni terror group al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which acted 
against the Shiite-dominated government that replaced Saddam Hussein after he was toppled by 
the US-led forces in 2003120. 
Since the USA plays a leading role in international relations, it is important to analyze which 
foreign policy this country will pursue in the future. After the USA's defeat in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, there was a commonly held opinion among foreign policy experts that the 
subsequent US administrations would become more cautious with interventions121. Yet, the 
recent proxy war between the USA and Russia in Syria (and especially the bombing of Syria on 
13 April 2018 by the USA, UK and France without UN authorization) as well as military 
confrontations between the USA and North Korea and China in the form of perpetual military 
drills have demonstrated that US foreign policy is still directed towards achieving goals and 
protecting national interests by all possible means, regardless of the rising warfare costs, 
illegality of military actions, worsening country's image and any drastic consequences that will 
obligatory follow.  
The ongoing decline of the US power against the background of the rising new great powers, 
most notably China, are likely to be further accompanied by war conflicts122. Some experts 
warn that in 2018, when the US militarism and protectionism have achieved their apogee (since 
even the US allies in the EU are economically punished, facing high tariffs in trade with the 
USA), the US economic and military confrontation with major players in the global arena has 
never brought the world closer to an outbreak of a new global war123. Skillful diplomacy, based 
on a thorough consideration of the interests of all parties and on the moral weighing of 
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immeasurable costs in the case of a global war, is the only hope for a peaceful resolution of 
superpowers' rebalancing now. 
It has to be remembered that while the first approach to diplomacy as a means for peaceful 
conflict resolution regards successful any suitable option that allows to avoid war, the second 
approach permits the exploitation of high-risk strategies to enforce the enemy's capitulation. 
The only restraining factor taken into account in the second approach is the ratio of gains to 
losses. Such a strategy should be viewed counterproductive for maintaining international 
security and order, which is to be protected by diplomats124. 
Overall, it can be concluded that violent conflict resolution should comprise a thorough 
understanding of the conflict origin and all its players' interests as well as a weighed diplomatic 
toolset that will allow first to contain the conflict within its borders and minimise losses from it 
among the locals until the conflict outlives itself or until more outright intervention for the sake 
of peace is made. Such a careful approach does require certain trade-offs on the part of all the 
parties involved. As Williams highlights: 
The essence of skilful crisis management lies in the reconciliation of the competing pressures 
which are inherent in the dual nature of crises... Crisis management requires that policy-
makers not only recognize the inherent dilemmas, but that they are willing and able to make 
the difficult trade-offs that are required125.  
The present paper discussing the peculiarities of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo (1999) 
demonstrates how hard it is sometimes for diplomats to insist on timely adequate trade-offs to 
stop a violent conflict that has already led to huge losses among the civilians and military 
forces and has a potential to spill over the borders of one particular state.   
In summary, both the norms of international law and the principle of the rule of law upon 
which it is based regulate how the international community can intervene in internal war 
conflicts when local forces cannot or do not want to resolve the conflict on their own. 
Preventive diplomacy is the first step in trying to help the conflicting parties to establish 
meaningful dialogue and end the conflict. However, when tools of preventive diplomacy are 
exhausted, it is essential for the international community to take decisive steps to stop human 
suffering in a war-torn region. 
Humanitarian intervention involves use of limited armed force that is authorized by the UN to 
restore and maintain order in the war region as peacekeeping force. Before Kosovo's conflict, 
international law envisaged a UN mandate as the only permissible tool for a third party to 
intervene in a war conflict which does not directly pose threat to a country. The problems of 
finding a consensus among UN Member States as well as overreliance of NATO on its own 
strengths and rules in Kosovo's conflict have shown that international law may need changes to 
protect human rights more effectively. The RtoP initiative aims to be one of such positive 
recent changes, although care must be taken to ensure that its norms are not applied to infringe 
national sovereignty or pursue own foreign policy goals.   
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CONCLUSION 
The present research has examined the legal and diplomatic implications for the Western 
military intervention in Kosovo's conflict (1999). An overview of literature on humanitarian 
crises and preventive diplomacy as well as the analysis of international law and humanitarian 
law and of the UN Security Council's resolutions related to the conflict has allowed the author 
of the paper to draw the following conclusions. 
Importantly, the Western humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999 should be analysed from 
the point of view of both the rule of law and norms of international law.  
On the one hand, NATO's aerial bombing of Kosovo from from 24 March till 10 June 1999, 
called the Operation Allied Force, could be regarded unlawful under international law as it was 
done without a UN mandate. The UN Security Council authorised the deployment of security 
international forces in Kosovo only on 10 June 1999 by adopting Resolution 1244 (1999). 
Adherence to this opinion is determined by the traditional view on the rule of law which states 
that compliance with law is a requirement for everyone as law is always limited by principles 
of reasoning and is designed on the basis of community norms clearly stipulating the good and 
right. 
Humanitarian intervention is allowed only in case there is a threat of an attack or if this 
measure can end mass abuse of human rights. NATO insists that the Operation Allied Force 
was held to stop ethnic cleansing when other measures of preventive diplomacy had been 
exhausted. Here one might argue over the proportionality of the reciprocal measure and over 
the fact whether it was limited to the immediate purpose, taking into account that the aerial 
bombing lasted for eleven weeks and must definitely have increased, not reduced, the suffering 
of the population under the attack. Also, it must be taken into account that NATO's aerial 
bombing campaign led to a big number of deaths among civilians, which can be considered war 
crimes and should be prosecuted accordingly. 
On the other hand, one should also take into consideration that before the adoption of 
Resolution 1244 (1999) there were four unsuccessful resolutions, which demonstrated a total 
inability of the conflicting parties to resolve the conflict by themselves. The UN Security 
Council's procrastination in taking more decisive measures than mere expressions of grave 
concerns on paper led to a situation when other countries, namely, NATO Member States took 
responsibility to end the conflict by military intervention. The fact that Resolution 1244 (1999) 
was adopted almost unanimously (by 14 members out of 15) shows that the international 
community was really ready to intervene into the conflict to stop violence in Kosovo.  
In addition, it has to be taken into account that the humanitarian intervention first by NATO 
without a UN mandate and then by international peacekeeping forces authorised by the UN has 
given the necessary result: the conflict was ended. In legal terms, the intervention has led to 
changes in the Charter of the UN and to the introduction of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) 
norm in international law that now allows the international community to legally protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in 
countries which are unable to resolve conflicts on their own. 
There are still areas in international law which need to be addressed to prevent violent conflicts 
in the future. For example, there should be a balance between humanitarian intervention and the 
right to sovereignty of a state. There should also be provisions in the Charter of the UN with 
regard to a set period of time in which the subjects are permitted to implement the UN Security 
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Council's orders under the threat of more drastic measures. The main principle guiding the 
changes in legislation must be order and protection of human rights.  
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